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Lorelei Jones 
  
Narratives of governance emphasise a shift in modes of organisation and action from public 
sector bureaucracies towards markets and networks. The extent and nature of this shift is the 
subject of debate, with some arguing that it has been overstated, that public-sector 
bureaucracies remain widespread, and others asking ‘do governments do less, or have they 
merely changed the way they do things?’ (Bevir 2013).  Adopting an historical lens, Bevir 
accounts for the shift towards markets and networks as originating in the twin trends of 
modernist social science - neoliberalism and rational economics on the one hand, and 
modernist sociology on the other. Neoliberalism and rational economics have produced 
policies based on a critique of bureaucracies and a perceived superiority of the market and the 
management practices of the private sector. Modernist sociology has produced a critique of 
markets, in terms of coordination and steering, and a belief that efficiency and effectiveness 
derive from stable relationships characterised by trust. From the viewpoint of modernist 
sociology both bureaucracies and markets have failed to address ‘wicked problems’, those 
complex and contested social problems that require networks of individuals and organisations 
across sectors. Significantly for this chapter, both sets of reforms - markets and networks - 
continue the bureaucratic faith in modernist expertise which continues to play a key role in 
governance.  
 
In this chapter I develop an account of contemporary healthcare governance that combines 
insights from the governance and governmentality literatures (Bevir 2011). I approach this 
task by, firstly, exploring the interaction of markets, networks and hierarchies. Drawing on a 
decentred theory of governance (Bevir 2013) I locate this interaction in a context of situated 
agency and local traditions. Secondly, I consider how, in this contemporary context of 
‘sedimented’ governance, governing is accomplished through inscription practices that align 
local action with government ambitions.  
 
My analysis draws on a study of local efforts to implement a national policy for ‘integrated 
care’. This policy required local agencies to work collaboratively in networks to deliver 
services. Networks were, initially, granted autonomy from central control and promised the 
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‘freedom to innovate’. What became evident, over the course of the research, was the 
resurgence of hierarchy, despite much of the pre-existing bureaucratic architecture of the 
NHS being dismantled by recent NHS reforms. The result was a hybrid form of governance 
whereby hierarchical control was exerted through networks. While in some localities 
hierarchical forms of control were contested and resisted, in others the perceived need to 
respond to this regime came to dominate the activities of local actors. In addition to 
hierarchical forms of control, governmental ambitions were also realised through a less 
visible assemblage of expert knowledges, procedures, calculations and documents. Looking 
specifically at two elements of this assemblage - data collection and analysis undertaken by 
NHS England (the ‘Pioneer stocktake’) and a policy evaluation commissioned from an 
academic team - I show how these analytical methodologies worked as indirect control 
technologies, constituting a particular version of integrated care and shaping local action.  
 
 
Sedimented governance and governmentality 
 
The last 20 years has seen English health care policy zig-zag between different governance 
mechanisms (hierarchy, markets and networks). Under New Labour, for example, there were 
three distinct policy streams based, in turn, on networks (e.g. national service frameworks), 
hierarchy (e.g. targets) and markets (choice and competition). Policy under the coalition 
government initially continued in the direction of ‘more market’ (Paton 2014), however, the 
current integrated care agenda marks a shift in direction once again toward networks. These 
policy streams have not simply replaced each other but have accumulated over time, or 
‘sedimented’, producing a complex mix. By this I mean, each mode of governance has not, 
nor cannot, erase the history of previous governance regimes, but instead each period of 
reform can be seen as building on the past, where elements of the past continue to provide the 
‘bedrock’ and ‘contours’ of the present, or they result in periodic protrusion and distortions 
into the contemporary form.  Different governance mechanisms interact, with each other, and 
with local practices, so that resultant action is both interactional and contingent.  
 
For example, looking at the implementation of market-based policies under New Labour, 
Jones et al (2014) found that local health service managers worked in a context of multiple 
and often conflicting policies. One response of local managers was to prioritise central 
targets, particularly those to do with waiting times, financial control and infection rates. This 
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response could be explained, in part, by the severity of the sanctions associated with failing to 
meet central targets, but it had the consequence of stymieing implementation of market-based 
policies. The implementation of market-based policies was also stymied by local social 
networks, between clinicians and, to a lesser extent, managers. Thus, contra to the goal of 
market-based policies, referral patterns remained largely unaltered as clinicians continued to 
use relationships and trust to manage uncertainty and coordinate action. However, while in 
some instances local social networks persisted, in others they were disrupted by market-based 
policies, leading to more adversarial relations, eroding trust, and preventing collaboration. 
Local action was also shaped by shared norms and beliefs, for example, a shared belief that 
patients want to attend the local hospital, resulting, again, in ‘sticky’ referral patterns. A 
sedimented governance framework is thus attuned to the interaction of policies, with each 
other, and with features of the local context, seeing resultant action as mediated by local 
(informal) social networks and shared values and traditions.  
 
Newman (2005) adopts a Foucauldian lens to illuminate power dynamics and explain social 
action in the context of sedimented governance.  From this perspective contradictions and 
tensions are created from the interaction of different discourses, associated with different 
governance regimes. These discourses construct subjectivities and political objects in 
different, often conflicting, ways. This creates tensions, for example, between constructs of 
‘consumers’ (market discourses) and ‘stakeholders’ (network discourses) or between the 
neutral administrator who is guided by routines (bureaucratic hierarchies), the entrepreneurial 
manager (markets), and the value driven leader (networks). Each discourse guides behaviour 
by channelling thinking, and through the very constitution of political subjects and objects. 
Their interaction, however, creates contradictions for local actors. These contradictions must 
be resolved, in some way, for local actors to ‘get on with the job’ (Newman 2005, p730). 
 
I similarly adopt a Foucauldian lens, but while Newman’s focus is on the agential strategies 
employed by local actors in response to multiple and conflicting discourses, I look instead at 
the role of expert knowledge and practices in governing. To do this I draw on 
governmentality scholarship to consider the assemblage of ‘programmes, calculations, 
techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities seek to 
embody and give effect to government ambitions’ (Rose and Miller 1992, p175).  Scholars 
such as Miller and Rose (1993, 2008) and Johnson (1993) have extended Foucault’s theory of 
governmentality by developing the role of professionals in governing. This work argues that 
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expertise, the practical activities of professionals, and the perceived neutrality and social 
authority of professionals, are essential to rendering realms of social life knowable and 
amenable to governing (Johnson 1993, Miller and Rose 1993, 2008).  One focus of this work 
are the seemingly mundane practices of notation and calculation - written reports, graphs, 
tables, statistics, etc. – that nonetheless play an important role in aligning local action with 
central policy imperatives.  
 
Ferlie et al (2012, 2013), argue that governmentality is a particularly potent theoretical 
resource for conceptualising ‘post bureaucratic’ forms of governance. They have applied this 
approach to the field of health care policy to explore the way the knowledge and techniques 
of ‘Evidence Based Medicine’ constitute subjectivities and reshape modes of thought and 
professional work practices. Empirical research, however, has been largely restricted to 
analysis of policy documents, with few studies observing governmental practices and the 
response of individuals in different contexts. As a consequence, scholarship has neglected the 
role of agency and the influence of alternative guides for action (such as local traditions).  
 
Taking a case study from the NHS in England, I consider the way governing is accomplished 
in sedimented contexts. Firstly, I describe the persistence of hierarchy, albeit in a networked 
form (a networked hierarchy hybrid). Secondly, I show how ‘action at a distance’ (Rose and 
Miller 1993) occurs through an assemblage of rationalities, knowledges and practices. I look 
in particular at two elements of this assemblage, data collection and analysis undertaken by 
NHS England (the NHS ‘stocktake’), and a policy evaluation commissioned from an 
academic team. I argue that these analytical methodologies work as an indirect control 
technology constituting a particular version of health care and shaping activities of local 
actors. I then show how the response to these practices varied in different contexts, resulting 
in action that was both variegated and contingent.  
 
 
The case of integrated care  
 
In England current health care policies emphasise the need for greater integration and 
continuity in the organisation and delivery of patient care. Integrated care policies illustrate a 
form of governance based on local networks of inter-connected organisations cooperating 
together on the basis of trust and reciprocity to realise greater coordination. Such networks 
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have the perceived benefits of engendering local flexibility, innovation and pace of change, 
and including more opportunities for public and stakeholder involvement in decision-making. 
In England the increasing use of networks as a form of organisation has been viewed as part 
of a broader shift involving the dispersal of power to a range of dynamic organisational 
actors, both public and private, that has accompanied the ‘hollowing out’ of the state (Rhodes 
2007). Ostensibly the NHS in England is exemplary of this shift. The Health and Social Care 
Act abolished the existing architecture of NHS hierarchy, removing layers of management at 
the local and regional levels and dispersing the functions of the centre among a range of 
‘partner’ organisations.  
 
In 2013, the coalition government selected 14 localities to be ‘pioneers’ in whole-system 
health and social care integration and to share learning with other localities (Department of 
Health 2013). This programme emanated from a network of ‘national partners’ made up of 
newly created single purpose arms-length bodies and other national organisations 
(Department of Health, NHS England, Monitor, Care Quality Commission, NHS Improving 
quality, NHS Health Education England, Public Health England, National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence, Local Government Association, Association of Directors of Adult 
Social Service, Association of Directors of Children’s Services, Social Care Institute for 
Excellence, Think Local Act Personal). Bids to be part of the Pioneer programme were 
invited from networks of local organisations working in partnership to provide integrated 
health and social care. These networks typically comprised health and social care 
commissioners (Clinical Commissioning Groups and the Local Authority respectively), 
health and social care providers (acute care trusts, community care trusts, and mental health 
care trusts) and, in some cases, voluntary or independent sector organisations.  
 
The successful localities varied in complexity, with some characterised by a single, 
coterminous, healthcare commissioner (Clinical Commissioning Group), social care 
commissioner (Local Authority) and acute care provider, while others had multiple 
commissioners and providers. Thus, the ‘Integrated Care and Support Pioneers’ were not 
small scale, or single pilots, but rather entire local health and social care systems that were 
expected to drive change ‘at scale and pace’ (Department of Health 2013). There was no 
accompanying funding (apart from £90,000 for each Pioneer) instead localities were offered 
‘support’ from the national partners. This support consisted of advice, expertise and resources 
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(websites, webinars, workshops etc) to share learning between localities and from 
international experts.   
 
The stated aim of national policy promoting integrated care is to improve services from the 
perspective of the patient (National Collaboration for Integrated Care and Support 2013). The 
Integrated Care and Support Pioneers programme defined integration as ‘person-centred 
coordinated care’ but did not prescribe how this should be achieved. Rather, the intention was 
to support and encourage localities to develop innovative models of service integration that 
had emerged through networks of health and social care organisations working in 
collaboration. The centrality of the patient perspective was underscored by the 
commissioning of National Voices, a coalition of health and social care charities in England, 
to produce a patient narrative for the integrated care. National Voices provided the following 
definition of integrated care from the patient perspective:  
 
My care is planned with people who work together to understand me and my carer(s), 
put me in control, co-ordinate and deliver services to achieve my best outcomes. 
(National Voices 2013) 
 
I developed this account from fieldwork in four localities in England undertaken as part of a 
national evaluation of the Pioneer programme commissioned by the Department of Health 
(Erens et al 2015). The evaluation followed the first two years of the Pioneer programme. 
Fieldwork involved observation of planning meetings, interviews with key officers and front-
line staff, informal conversations, visiting facilities and initiatives, and reading planning 
documents and meeting papers.  
 
 
The reification of national policy and the standardisation of local activities 
 
Initially there was considerable diversity in the plans of the 14 local networks, both in terms 
of planned activities and espoused goals and values. In many instances localities had long-
term strategies aimed at preventing ill health by addressing ‘upstream’ factors that influence 
health and wellbeing, such as housing and early-years education. Most also had goals that 
extended beyond health service outputs to include, for example, reductions in health 
inequalities, social inclusion, increased democratic participation, community capacity 
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development, urban regeneration and restorative justice. Over time, however, there was a 
shift in the focus and activities of local actors, to implementing an increasingly narrow set of 
concrete healthcare initiatives, in particular, a community-based multidisciplinary team and 
‘care navigator’ (Erens et al 2015). A particular ‘programme logic’ also emerged, whereby 
concrete initiatives such as a multi-disciplinary team, were seen primarily in instrumental 
terms, as means of reducing emergency admissions to hospitals, and ‘rebalancing the system’ 
so that more health care was provided in community, rather than acute, settings. The ultimate 
aim was to reduce costs. In this way a national policy to provide ‘more integrated care’ 
became reified as a particular set of practices with particular intended outcomes. This 
reification of integrated care was reflected in the slippage in the vocabulary among local 
actors from ‘being a Pioneer’, to ‘the Pioneer’ when referring to these concrete initiatives. In 
the remainder of this chapter I consider the ways this reification of integrated care, and an 
accompanying standardisation of local activities, was accomplished through a combination of 
hierarchical and other, less visible, forms of control.  
 
 
The resurgence of hierarchy 
 
When I started fieldwork a key question in my mind was ‘how would a policy to provide 
more integrated care interact with existing market-based polices?’.  Market-based policies 
were re-introduced to the NHS in England under New Labour (having previously been 
introduced in the 1990s by the conservative government) and continued under the coalition 
government. The underlying assumption was that competition between a wider-range of 
providers would improve the quality and efficiency of services (Jones et al 2014). The Health 
and Social Care Act (2012) sought to embed a provider market in the NHS by setting out an 
expectation that health care commissioners would, with some exceptions, use competitive 
tendering to commission services.  
 
A key critique of market-based policies in the NHS is that they prevent the collaboration 
between individuals and organisations that is necessary in health and social care (Flynn et al 
1996). Therefore, one a priori hypothesis for this study was that there would be a conflict 
between integrated care policy and existing market-based policies and the structures that had 
been put in place to promote local markets in health care. This conflict was not as apparent as 
expected. Some acute care providers claimed that the local practice of competitive tendering 
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promoted secrecy, rather than the openness and transparency required for collaboration. And 
interviewees claimed that the practice of competitive tendering in community services was a 
barrier for integrated care because providers were required to compete against each other for 
contracts. The condition-specific approach to contracting was also seen to inhibit integrated 
care for people with multiple long-term conditions. Yet the claims made by local actors with 
regard to the influence of pre-existing market structures varied widely between contexts. In 
some instances, such as where a single commissioner and a single acute provider were 
interdependent, market incentives were seen by local actors as irrelevant. In other localities, 
the commissioner chose simply not to use them. These findings reflect the fact that 
implementation of market-based reforms across England was varied, contingent on features 
of the local context, including the approach taken by different NHS regional managers 
(Peckham et al 2012).  The findings may also reflect a decline in the uptake of market-based 
incentives by commissioners following the announcement in November 2014 by the Health 
Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, of a shift in direction in national policy, from choice and 
competition, to integrated care (West 2014). These findings highlight the fact that in England 
the market has always been a ‘top down’ market (Paton 2014) so that national pressure could 
be reduced at will, with a corresponding response from localities.  
 
The more conspicuous development was the resurgence of hierarchy. This occurred despite 
the coalition government having dismantled much of the pre-existing bureaucratic 
architecture of the NHS, so that what emerged over the course of the study was a ‘networked 
hierarchy’. One manifestation of hierarchy was the use, by NHS England, of budget 
allocation combined with setting, and monitoring, targets. This took the form of the ‘Better 
Care Fund’, a proportion of which was conditional on meeting a target for reducing 
‘avoidable’ emergency admissions (Department of Health and Department for Communities 
and Local Government 2014).  The Better Care Fund required that funds would be held in a 
local pooled budget under joint governance between health and social care commissioners 
and used to fund joint integration plans. These plans were required to be submitted, and 
approved, via a nationally prescribed template. In addition to meeting a target for reducing 
avoidable emergency admissions, localities were also required to report against other metrics 
covering admissions to residential and care homes, delayed transfers of care, effectiveness of 
reablement initiatives and a measure of patient experience. The Better Care Fund thus 
embodied an explicit managerial objective of moving care out of hospitals so as to reduce 
costs. In one instance, local performance against the Better Care Fund metrics was shared 
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with front line staff during a multidisciplinary team meeting, suggesting that it was not just 
local managers, but front line staff, who were expected to understand their work in these 
terms. In this way the Better Care Fund, and the accompanying targets, introduced a 
bureaucratic infrastructure which enabled the regulation of the activities of local networks.  
 
Some local organisations also received the ‘Monday morning call’, a personal telephone call 
from the Health Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, to CEOs of acute trusts which had failed to meet the 
target for reducing emergency admissions (Campbell 2013). The resurgence of hierarchy was 
also evident in the practice of personal visits by the CEO of NHS England, Simon Stevens, to 
localities. As illustrated in the following extract, during these visits the CEO of NHS England 
communicated an expectation (contra to assurances of local autonomy given in national 
policy documents) that localities would pursue particular objectives, namely reducing 
emergency admissions: 
 
I can still hear Simon Stevens in my ear, ‘how quickly are you going to reduce 
emergency admissions?’ (CCG Chair, Board meeting June 2015)  
 
Responses from localities to the resurgence of hierarchy varied. In some cases these 
manifestations of hierarchy were resisted, in others the perceived need to respond to this 
regime came to dominate the activities of local actors. So, for example, in one case study 
initial plans were aimed at improving the wellbeing of residents (conceived broadly in social 
and economic terms) and a long-term focus on prevention of the harmful consequences of 
social deprivation through early intervention (i.e. targeting the under fives). This locality had 
a system-wide alignment of strategies among relevant agencies and the overall plan remained 
unchanged despite considerable top-down pressure. In the following extract from an 
interview transcript the local programme lead is describing how he sees the relationship 
between national policy and local strategy: 
So Pioneer to us, the reason that we signed up for that as [locality], was 
essentially to say ‘Well could this help us to do what we wanted to do further 
and faster?’, and where that is able to do that, well that’s great, and where it 
isn’t, well we won't do it, whereas I know lots of others, well most of the other 
sites across the country have used Pioneer to be their transformation 
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programme and they describe their transformation programme as their Pioneer 
programme; well we don’t do that.   
 
In the following excerpt, from another manager in this locality, there is a sense of ‘push back’ 
in response to central pressure to demonstrate progress in quantifiable terms: 
 
Interviewer: You said you needed a period of uncertainty or exploration before 
you could get your concrete building blocks in place.  Did you feel that the 
centre gave you that space? You didn’t feel anyone breathing down your neck 
wanting fast results?  Or were you able to talk to them about that? 
 
Respondent: I would say there was a bit of both really. I think there was a bit 
of, ‘when are we going to see something, when are we going to see some 
impact’?  But I think equally people understood that our model in [locality], 
we wanted to ensure that it was co-produced, there was good buy-in from 
clinician stakeholders, that it was something that was developed from the grass 
roots through the bottom-up approach, and so I think people accepted that if 
we were going to be true to that, it wasn’t going to be a quick fix, it wasn’t 
going out with a ‘this is how it’s going to be’.  There was a need to be far 
more organic in approach.  And so I think that did balance out some of the, 
‘well, when are we going to see results?’ type of comments that we did get as 
well, but people sort of came round to understanding where we were coming 
from. 
Interviewer: You say people came around, does that include the centre? 
Respondent: We’ve had numerous visits from the centre, and I think 
everybody has accepted the approach we have taken.  
 
Features of the local context that might have influenced this approach include leadership of 
the network by the Local Authority (rather than the NHS) and strong leadership of the Health 
and Wellbeing Board by a local councillor.  For example, during one meeting of the Health 
and Wellbeing Board, attended by a representative of NHS England, the chair was observed 
robustly challenging the authority of NHS England, and the accuracy and legitimacy of their 
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analysis, and defending locally defined priorities. Interview accounts, planning documents, 
observations and informal conversations also exuded a sense of strong shared geographical 
identity and a culture of local pride and autonomy.  
 
In contrast, in another case study local plans changed over the course of the evaluation. This 
locality initially had radical plans aimed at achieving a more broadly conceived notion of 
citizen wellbeing through an ‘asset based’ approach to community development, and a long-
term focus on prevention by targeting children and young people. However, by the end of the 
evaluation, local plans were for a primary care multidisciplinary team and a care navigator. 
Observing a meeting of the governing board toward the end of the study it was apparent that 
the board were consumed by a perceived imperative to meet the Better Care Fund targets. 
This meeting was dominated by discussion of performance against the Better Care Fund 
metrics. At one point the health commissioner’s Director of Strategy suggested that 
improvement on one of the targets might be achieved by better cleaning of the data. This 
particular meeting was chaired by the Director of Adult Services (an agency which has 
traditionally sat outside of the NHS hierarchy, accountable horizontally to locally elected 
councillors). She concluded the discussion of performance against the Better Care Fund 
metrics by saying ‘this puts us in an uncomfortable position in relation to NHS England’ 
(fieldnotes May 2015).  The content of this meeting contrasted with that of early meetings 
where more time was devoted to collaborative planning to achieve locally defined objectives.  
 
Unlike the first case study, in this second case study the network was led by the healthcare 
commissioner so that the idea of an NHS hierarchy may have held more legitimacy. The 
locality also occupied a newly created geographical footprint that brought together previously 
distinct geographical cultures and where a shared identity was in its infancy. It also faced 
severe financial challenges. Indeed, one reading of the data is that it suggests a strategic 
reframing on the part of local actors in order to garner external resources (financial and other 
support from NHS England).  
 
The resurgence of hierarchy is interpreted here as resulting from the realpolitik of growing 
demand and reduced budgets. Between 2010 and 2013 spending on adult social care 
decreased by 12% in real terms (LGA/ADASS 2014). Whilst spending over this same period 
on the NHS increased on average by 0.8% per year, this is below the estimated 4% needed to 
meet increases in demand for health care (Appleby et al 2015). And at the time data was 
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being collected the government was facing a general election (held in May 2015). In this 
context ministers and senior civil servants sought to control policy implementation, to ensure 
that local activities were aligned with national imperatives to reduce spending, and to 
demonstrate progress in quantifiable terms. As an informant from one of the national 
regulators noted, ‘there is no money so everyone at the centre wants grip’ (fieldnotes, May 
2015).  
  
The resurgence of hierarchy might also be interpreted as resulting from the persistence of 
hierarchy as a tradition and cultural template within the NHS, so that it has become, for many 
who work in the NHS ‘the way things are done around here’ (Exworthy et al 2011, Exworthy 
and Frosini 2008). As a consequence, patterns of behaviour, conditioned by previous 
bureaucratic processes, remain unaltered despite shifts in national policy direction. Local 
managers, especially those who have worked in the NHS for a long time, may have become 
inured to hierarchy, habitually responding to its remnants and anticipating its return. 
 
 
Governing in the networked hierarchy 
 
My research also suggests that local action was shaped, not just by the coercive measures 
described above, but also by less direct, and less visible, means of regulation and persuasion. 
Here, I draw on the work of Foucault (1979, 1990, 1991) to consider the operation and effect 
of micro technologies of power. I focus on the analytical methodologies of the Pioneer 
‘stocktake’ undertaken by NHS England, and the national evaluation of the Pioneer 
programme. These analytical methodologies are here viewed as indirect control technologies 
that shape local action in line with government objectives.  
 
 
NHS England ‘stocktake’ 
 
In April 2015 the ‘support’ function of the Integrated Care and Support Pioneers programme 
was transferred from a separate arms-length body known as ‘NHS Improving Quality’ (NHS 
IQ) to NHS England where it was redesigned and relaunched. This function continued to be 
framed as ‘support’ (rather than ‘performance management’) offering localities assistance in 
form of ‘facilitation’, ‘development’, ‘coaching’ and so forth. Shortly afterwards, NHS 
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England announced a Pioneer ‘stocktake’. The stocktake collected information from a range 
of sources of published statistics which was then collated in a ‘Data Pack’, a Power Point 
slide pack given to each locality. The Data Pack presented the data that had been collected in 
graphs and tables so as to compare each locality with other Pioneer sites against a selection of 
metrics. According to this document the aim of the stocktake was to ‘create a single ‘one stop 
shop’ information resource which provides an overview of the Integrated Care programme 
using a consistent narrative and library of data’. 
 
Initial slides in the Data Pack include a section on ‘demographics’ - comprising graphs and 
maps for the locality showing the distribution of the population in terms of age and ethnicity, 
followed by a section on finance, showing in tabular form the healthcare commissioner’s 
allocations and key areas of spend. The next section focused on the ‘Ambitions of the Pioneer 
Better Care Fund Plans’, and included the following table which gives expenditure against 
‘benefits’:  
 
Table 1. Plan-specific view – benefits (Source NHS England. Pioneer Stocktake. Data Pack). 
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The above metrics embody a managerial imperative for health services concerned with cost 
savings. In the Data Pack these metrics are also presented in bar graphs that compare all 
Pioneer localities. In this way localities can view their own performance against these metrics 
with other localities. In Foucauldian terms the NHS England Stocktake inscribes information 
about a locality and transports it to the centre. In doing so it makes the multitude of diverse 
activities of professionals at the periphery visible and knowable to the centre, but it also 
regulates activity at the periphery by defining, privileging and constituting a particular 
version of integrated care, one where the primary objective is to reduce emergency 
admissions to hospitals and thereby reduce costs. ‘Taking stock’ as Foucault observed, is not 
just about examination but about correction. Whilst Foucault was referring to the individual 
as the ‘stocktaking administrator’ (1988, p 33) the Pioneer Stocktake acts in a similar way on 
collectivities. Localities are encouraged to compare themselves with others and correct. The 
Stocktake normalises both the means and the ends of health care, shaping thinking and 
subsequent action. Whilst the subsequent decisions by local actors are apparently free from 
visible coercion, they are shaped by a particular understanding of integrated care, constituted 
in a shared vocabulary, theory and explanation. This influence is largely invisible, hidden in 
the seemingly neutral and objective practices of data collection and analysis. The influence of 
the NHS England Stocktake on local action was not, however, complete. In some areas, the 
relevance of the measures were contested and the process was resisted by local actors. For 
example, at one local planning meeting where a representative from NHS England was 
introducing the Data Pack, the public and patient involvement representative commented that 
the metrics did not capture the patient experience. In another example, during conversation 
with managers from NHS England they reported that the Stocktake had ‘a cool reception in 
some places’ with local actors concerned by the administrative burden and ‘feeling like they 
are being performance managed’ (fieldnotes July 2015).  
 
 
Policy evaluation 
 
Like other national policies, the Pioneer programme included an independent evaluation 
commissioned from an academic team. Evaluation refers to the activities of applied social 
scientists who collect and analyse data to provide information on program results (Browne 
and Wildavsky 1984). Evaluation of national policy became routine under New Labour as 
part of a ‘modernisation’ programme underpinned by a philosophy of developing sustainable 
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policies based on ‘what works’ (Newman 2001). In institutional theory, evaluation plays an 
important role in establishing the legitimacy of policy processes, demonstrating that the 
process is rational and procedurally correct (Feldman and March 1981). Like audit, 
evaluation has become increasingly important in ‘post bureaucratic’ governance contexts 
where direct bureaucratic accountability has declined (Power 1997). In this section I consider 
how the inscription practices and analytical methodologies of evaluation align local action 
with governmental objectives.  
 
The evaluation of the Pioneer programme employed an interview topic guide, a list of 
questions which reflected ‘what the funder wanted to know’.  One of the questions was ‘how 
many patients/service users had experienced changes in service delivery?’. This question 
reflects a political rationality concerned with quantifying progress. It also constructs a 
particular version of integrated care. The question only makes sense if integrated care is 
understood as a concrete intervention (rather than say a dimension of quality). The number of 
patients or service users who receive the intervention can then be counted. Thus the only way 
localities can comply with this seemingly neutral process of data collection is through this 
particular understanding of integrated care. Another question was ‘what are they doing?’. To 
answer this question data was collected using a spreadsheet that displayed, in rows, the 
localities, and, in columns, pre-determined categories of initiative (multidisciplinary team, 
care navigator, single point of access and so forth). In this way a procedure for classifying 
and comparing localities reinforced the reification of integrated care as a narrow set of 
concrete initiatives.  
 
The evaluation of the Integrated Care and Support Pioneers included plans to conduct a cost-
effectiveness analysis (Policy Innovation Research Unit 2015). Although the procedure for 
the analysis had not been finalised at the time of fieldwork, there had been discussions within 
the team about suitable initiatives that could be used for the analysis. Like the interview topic 
guide, and the spreadsheets used to classify and compare sites, the methodology of the cost-
effectiveness analysis contributes to the reification of integrated care as a concrete initiative, 
and the standardisation of network activities. In order to assign a value to the ‘cost’ part of 
the analysis integrated care must become something that can be costed, and in order to 
compare across sites, it must be standardised. In the process the policy objective of 
‘integrated care’ becomes elided with a concrete initiative such as a multidisciplinary team. 
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Just as organisations have to change to make them auditable (Power 1997) so to health care 
has to change to make it evaluable. 
 
Evaluation inheres an objective instrumental ideal. One assumption of this mode of analysis 
is that the methods themselves are neutral. However, as Tribe (1972) has argued, scientific 
language, like any language, constrains the way we think about the world. Take, for instance, 
the cost-effectiveness analysis, one of the key analytical methodologies of policy evaluation. 
Cost-effectiveness analysis embodies means-end rationality and (by definition) a managerial 
ideology concerned primarily with cost and operational effectiveness. Moreover, the focus on 
the end result of care processes, and a restricted focus on what can be readily measured, 
excludes many dimensions of care that are less tangible but may be important to patients and 
professionals, such as the quality of interaction between patients and staff and emotional 
support (Brown 2008). Indeed, for patients with a long-term condition it is often the process 
of care, rather than the end-result, that matters most to patients (Mol 2008). It is not just that 
these values are excluded from analyses, but that the analysis constructs a particular version 
of health care. The discursive effects of these analytical methodologies have implications in 
the material world in the way that they influence managerial practice and, in turn, the 
behaviour of health care staff.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
The findings from this study illustrate the sedimentation of governance in the NHS in 
England. A sedimented governance framework is attuned to the interaction of governance 
mechanisms in local contexts. In this instance a policy based on networks of local 
organisations working in partnership to provide integrated health and social care was 
introduced into a context of pre-existing market structures. What was observed was a largely 
discretionary market, as local actors responded to national signals of a change in policy 
direction. Then, over the period of the study, there was an observable resurgence of 
hierarchy, manifested in the use by NHS England of the top-down tools of budget allocation 
and central targets, and coercive forms of influence through positions of formal political 
authority. The interaction of networks and hierarchy produced a network-hierarchy hybrid. In 
the networked hierarchy the practices of data collection, analysis and evaluation are key 
resources for governing. Through these analytical methodologies a particular version of 
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integrated care is constructed and the actions of local agents are regulated. These practices 
channel the action of local managers and professionals in a way that focuses attention on 
measures of service efficiency and cost savings, but are poorly aligned with the aim of 
improving the patient experience.  
 
Sedimented governance is produced by the combination of neoliberal regimes, committed to 
decentred forms of coordination and control, and the persistence of hierarchy in contexts 
where citizens and their representatives ‘will, in one way or another, sooner or later, insist on 
accountability on the part of those who act in their name using resources appropriated from 
them’ (Lynn 2011, p231). This study highlights the top-down nature of markets and (formal) 
networks in the NHS, their use by the centre and their political role as statements of ideology, 
rhetorical devices and discursive strategies to conceal and bolster central control.  
 
The findings from this study have implications for policy in the way they illustrate what 
happens when different instruments of government interact. In government programmes, 
networks are used where problems lie beyond the reach of any single agency and thus can 
only be addressed by professionals and organisations working together across sectors (Bevir 
2013). Networks have the perceived benefits of engendering local flexibility, innovation and 
pace of change. The effect of hierarchies on networks, however, is to reduce their autonomy, 
distinctiveness and effectiveness (Rhodes 2007). The findings from this study are consistent 
with the ‘corruption’ of networks by hierarchy observed by Addicott et al (2007) in relation 
to cancer networks. They found that central targets dominated the activities of local networks 
and displaced alternative objectives such as sharing learning. The findings from my research 
show how networked governance can reinforce central control, illustrating the way that a 
single purpose agency (in this case NHS England) can achieve a greater focus on policy 
implementation than could ever be realised by a multi-purpose bureaucracy. 
 
I have combined insights from the governance and governmentality literature to show how 
governing is accomplished in sedimented contexts. In this study central control was bolstered 
by an assemblage of procedures, analyses, calculations and documents. One element of this 
assemblage was the ‘support’ provided by NHS England to Pioneer sites. Consisting of 
numerous ‘soft’ forms of control (facilitation, coaching, expertise) the support provided by 
NHS England mimics the role of private management consulting firms, and like private 
management consulting firms, has the effect of homogenising forms of organisation 
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(DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  My focus was on the inscription practices of data collection, 
analysis and evaluation and how these worked as indirect control technologies, constituting 
political objects and shaping action. This analysis attends to the role of expert knowledge and 
practices in governing, in this case those of health service research. The analytical 
methodologies of health services research transport information about localities to the centre, 
classifying and comparing localities to make them knowable and thus governable. At the 
same time these inscription practices constitute the political object, enhance central control 
through standardisation of activities and regulate the behaviour of local actors.  
 
I also challenge Foucaudian scholarship that has made theoretical assumptions of control 
without empirical data from the observation of local practices. I show not just how 
governmentality combines with more sovereign forms of power in empirical contexts, but 
also how different forms of power interact with situated agency. In one locality both 
sovereign and governmental forms of power were rejected by local actors who were instead 
guided by local meanings including a local culture of pride and autonomy. In another locality 
the local actors responded with a strategic reframing aligned with national objectives in order 
to garner external resources. The combined picture is one of governing practices that are 
contingent, variegated and sedimented.  
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